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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PETE~ DOENGES, MILES CROCKARD
WILLIAM BOWEN, RICHARD H. WATSON
CARL PETERSON, and EMIGRATION
'
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,

Plaintiff-Respondents,
v,

CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation;
EMIGRATION PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP
a Utah limited partnership, BOWERSSOREnSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, and FRED A. SMOLKA,
Defendant-Appellants,

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16649

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal is from a Memorandum Decision of
Judge Dean E. Conder, of the Third Judicial District Court,
holding that the annexation procedures of Section 10-2-401,
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 1977) limiting the petitioning
portion of the annexation procedure to persons owning property
within the area to be annexed violated the equal protection
requirement of both the United States and Utah State Constitutions.
II.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

On April 10, 1979, the Salt Lake City Commission
voted unanimously to annex portions of Emigration Canyon to
Salt Lake City.

On April 17, 1979, a Temporary Restraining

Orde1 was issued, restraining the City from taking any steps
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in furtherance of the Commission's decision of annexation.
(Record on Appeal at R. 181 (hereinafter pages in Record will
be referred to as "R. __".).)

On May 29, 1979, plaintiffs'

motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants'
motions to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the Temporary
Restraining Order were heard before the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft.

Judge Croft found that the complaint did not state a

claim upon which relief could be granted and that there was
no injury claimed or shown to support injunctive relief.
(Partial Transcript of Proceedings, May 29, 1979, p. 8, at
R. 1041.)

Without dismissing the Complaint, Judge Croft allowed

plaintiffs ten days in which to amend to state a claim including
a claim for injunctive relief.

(Id., pp. 14-15, at R. 1053-53.)

Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on June 7,
1979.

Request for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65(a)

was omitted and no direct injury ·to the plaintiffs was
alleged.

(R. 359.)
The Temporary Restraining Order was continued until

August 20, 1979, even though a bond uas never filed and
even though the Complaint in this action did not seek preliminary
injunctive relief.
On August 9, 1979, the defendants' motions for

sumrna~

judgment and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment
were heard before the Honorable Dean E. Conder.

Aside from the

depositions and affidavits on file, no evidence was offered
by the plaintiffs in further support of the Second Amended
Complaint.

-2-
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As a matter of law, the District Court of the Third
Judicial District fuund and held by Memorandum Decision
dated August 20, 1979, that the provisions of Section 10-2-401,
Annexation of Contiguous Territory, Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.

1977), limiting to landowners the petition process triggering
a hearing on the question of annexation violated both the United
States and the Utah State's Constitutions' "equal protection"
requirements.

(R. 603-605.)

(A copy of the statute Sections

10-2-401 and 10-2-402 are attached hereto as Exhibit "A".)

In

its Memorandur:i Decision, the district court also granted a
permanent injunction.

(R. 605.)

The district court found all

other issues moot, and refrained from making a decision on any
issues. *

(R. 605.)

The Hemorandum Decision did not, nor did

the court, request separate Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law.
On August 27, 1979, Defendant-Appellants filed a
Notice of Appeal from the district court's Memorandum Decision.
(R.

748.) Ten days later, upon the unsolicited submission

by plaintiffs, the court signed a document entitled Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
On September 18, 1979, the defendants filed a Notice
of Appeal from the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment raising the issue, inter alia, that the
district court was without jurisdiction to enter Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law as the court was without jurisdiction
*Judge Conder explained in a conference on ~ctob7r 15, 1979,
that he had not considered or decided defendants motions for
summary judgment except tu the extent of the issue of
constitutionality and had made no decision or determination of
any other issues raised.
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with the filing of the Notice of Appeal.

The defendants filed

a motion to set aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law or in the alternative, to amend them.

The court concluded

that as a Notice of Appeal had been filed, it had been divested
of jurisdiction and could not consider the matter.
III.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Defendant-Appellants respectfully request that
this Court:

(1) Strike the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions~

Law and Judgment entered by the district court on September 6,
1979, as that court was without jurisdiction to proceed in the
matter after the filing of the Hot ice of Appeal on August 27, 191!
Or, in the alternative, to strike the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the ground that they are not supported

by the evidence or the law;
(2)

Reverse the Memorandum Decision of August 20, 1971

and find that the annexation provisions of Section 10-2-401,
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.

1977) are constitutional within thi

equal protection provisions of both the Federal and State
Constitutions;
(3)

Find that the district court erred in failing

to grant the Defendant-Appellants' motions for summary judgment;
(4)

Enter judgment for the Defendant-Appellants

and dissolve the permanent injunction;
(5)

Find that the Salt Lake City Commission had the

authority and had properly voted for annexation of Emieration
Canyon; and
(6)

Order that annexation be forthwith completed.
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IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Residents of Emigration Canyon Properly

Petitioned the Salt Lake City Commission to Consider Annexation
to Salt Lake City of Certain Areas Within Emigration Canyon.
Between September 15, 1977, and August 8, 1978, three
petitions for annexations of different contiguous areas within
Emigration Canyon were filed with the Salt Lake City Commission.
These petitions requested that the Salt Lake City Commission
consider annexation of these areas to Salt Lake City.
Petitions containing the signatures of more than
one-half of the landowners owning more than one-third of the
land within the area requesting annexation and a plat of the
entire area to be annexed under the petitions were filed
with the City as required by statute.

These filings complied

in all respects with the requirements of the annexation
statutes, Sections 10-2-401 and 10-2-402.
p •.

(Johnson Depo.,

4, at R. 898.)
B.

Upon the Filing of the Petition, Salt Lake City

Began Considering the Advisability of Annexation and Held
Numerous Public Hearings at which all Interested Parties were
Allowed to Speak.

Salt Lake City immediately began investigating

the possibility of the proposed annexation.

The three petitions

were consolidated and considered as one by the Board of City
Commissioners.

(Mayor Wilson Depo., Exhibit 1, at R.

.)

The proposed annexation was investigated and studied
by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning Commission from
November of 1977, until the final hearing a;1d recommendation of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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August 10, 1978.

(Jorgensen Depo. pp. 18, 41, at R. 824.)

During this period the Commission held numerous public hearings,
(Jorgensen Depo., p. 41 & Ex. 9, at R. 824.)

At these hearinos
0

I

petitions were received from any interested party including
the Plaintiff-Respondents.

Beginning November 10, 1978,

Plaintiff-Respondents, through their attorney, Craig Smay,

fil~

petitions with the Planning and Zoning Commission in opposition
to the proposed annexation.
p. 1, at R. 824.)

(Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit No. 9,

Again, on behalf of himself as a resident

living within Emigration Canyon, and also on behalf of Plaintiff.
Respondents, Mr. Smay appeared and presented arguments in
opposition to the proposed annexation at the informal hearing
before the Planning and Zoning Commission on March 10, 1979,
(R. 824, Id. at, Ex. No. 9, p.8.)

also present at that

hearing and participating therein was the Plaintiff-Respondent
Miles Crockard.

(R. 824, Id. at,· Ex. 9, p. 9.)

In addition,

Plaintiffs' representative and attorney, Craig Smay, was
avialable to the Planning and Zoning Commission to answer
questions on the Plaintiff-Respondents' behalf in opposition
to annexation.

(R. 824, Id., at Ex. 9, pp. 32-33.)

During the hearings and investigation, the Planning
and Zoning Commission concluded that "The only way the area
can be properly served is in the City."
47.)

(R. 824, Id. at

The only access to this area was through the City.

(R. 824, Id. at 58.) And, as part of the County, the area
could not be developed.

(R. 824, Id. at 15.)

The Commission

also found that the proposed annexation met the statutory

-6-
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requirement of contiguity.

"The east boundary [of the City]

is the west boundary of the area to be annexed."

(R. 824 Id.

at 9.)
The Plannine and Zoning Commission found that new
zoning was an essential part of the annexation as Salt Lake City
did not

·~ave

a classification that would meet the needs of

Emigration Canyon."

(R. 824 Id. at 19.)

Therefore, an extensive

investigation was conducted considering water and sewer service,
flood control, school, fire, garbage and police as well as
the soil conditions, the amount of slope of the ground, and
the traffic capabilities of the Canyon to determine just what
zoning would be appropriate.

(R. 824 Id. at 19-21; 43-44, 46, 47.)

Two zoning regulations were proposed for Emigration Canyon.
"R-lC" and "B-3C", both with an "F-1" overlay.

(R. 824 Id. at 4-7.)

These zoning classifications were "geared to the terrain, the
special problems that you find in· canyon or canyon-like areas."

(R. 824 Id. at 5.)
After more than nine months of hearings wherein the
arguments and petitions of all interested parties, both for
and against annexation were considered, and the reports of all
city cormnissions and departments were considered, the Planning
and Zoning Collllllission, by letter dated August 24, 1978, recommended
that the Salt Lake City Commission approve annexation of the
areas within Emigration Canyon under certain specific conditions.
(R. 824 Id. at 43-44, 18, 41 and Exhibit No. 1.)
It is the feeling of the Planning Commi:sion that
areas adjoining the City Limits, affecting the
City, and where development can take place,.
should be annexed to the City wherever possible,

-7-
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-thus filling the basic reason for a city, that of
providing proper service to developable areas.
In the case of Emigration Canyon, adequate services
can be provided only by Salt Lake City.
It is, therefore, the recommendation of the
Planning Comrnission that a public hearing be
held to consider annexing the property as
requested • • • • (R. 824, Id. at Ex. 1.)
After receiving the recommendation from the Planning
and Zoning Commission and the reports from all the department
heads, the City Commission began its own investigation and
hearings on the matter.

As explained by Mayor Wilson at his

deposition, the decision of the City Commission not only to
join the petitions for annexation, but also to grant annexation
of the area contained within the petition was based on extensive
investigation by the City Commission.

(Mayor Wilson Depo •

.)

PP• 27-33, at R.

Public hearings were held in late January and early
February, 1979.
this matter.
off.

Three days were ·set aside for hearint;s on

During these public hearings no witness was cut

Mr. Smay, a representative of the Plaintiff-Respondents,

testified and was given an opportunity to discuss any and all
matters he desired.

(Wilson Depo. p. 30, at R.

.)

A.
We allowed at least a full day
for our department heads to come in and give us their
both written and oral recommendations.

Q. Then you also had the public hearings
where citizens could come and voice their opinions?

A. Yes. We had three days of hearings. The
first day basically was the department head input. .
The second day was basically--both sides would organiz,
presentations. And then the third day was from any
member of the public that hadn't had a chance ~o
testify could come to the mike and express their
feelings. (Mayor Wilson Depo. p. 29, at R.
.)
-·8-
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C.

Plaintiff-Respondents Participated Extensively in the

Hearings on Annexation.

Throughout the annexation proceedin<'s
0
•

the Plaintiff-Respondents had every opportunity to be heard.
Following the filing of the petitions for annexation, numerous
and extensive public hearings were held where the plaintiffs
not only were given an opportunity to, but did appear and
argue in opposition to annexation,
First, the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning
Commission investigated the proposed annexation and held numerous
public hearings beginning in November of 1977, and concluding
August 10, 1979.

(Exhibit #9 to the Jorgensen Deposition is

the Minutes to all the meetings held to consider the annexation
of Emigration Canyon.

See, R. 824.)

At these hearinl;S petitions

were received from any interested party.

A petition was filed

on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondents by Craig Smay on
Hovember 10, 1977, opposing annexation and explaining the reasons
therefore.

(Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit 119, p. 1, at R. 824.)

Again on behalf of himself and the Plaintiff-Respondents, Mr.
Smay appeared at the March 10, 1978 informal hearing before
the Planning and Zoning Commission and argued Plaintiff-Respondents'
reasons for opposing annexation.
#9, p. 8, at R. 824.)

(Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit

Also, taking part in that hearing was

the Plaintiff-Respondent Miles Crockard.

(Id., P• 9, at R. 824.)

In addition, the Planning Commission had Craig Smay available
to answer questions on behalf of those opposing annexation.
(Id., Ex. 9 pp. 32-33, at R. 824.)
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Three days of public hearings were held by the City
Commission during which all interested parties were again allowe:
to speak, including Mr. Smay speaking for the PlaintiffRespondents.

(Bowen Depo., p.24, at R.

.)

Mr. Crockard attended and participated in Planning.
and Zoning Commission hearings on the matter.
Depo., Exhibit 119, p. 9, at R. 824.)

(Jorgensen

Peterson, the renterwi

Mr.

had been asked by Plaintiff-Respondents to lend his name to
the law suit did not bother to attend any of the hearings.
(Petersen Depo., pp. 14-15, at R. 826.)

Mr. Bowen, attended

the public meetings concerning annexation at Bonneville
School, the City Commission and the Planning and Zoning
Connnission.

(Bowen Depo., pp. 5, 6, at R.

.)

Mr.

Bowen also voiced his position to the Mayor in his office
privately (Id., pp. 6, 18, 21, at R.
Commission at the public hearings:
at R.

•)

, .) and to the City
(Id., pp.

6, 21-22, 24,

Mr. Bowen even presented an alternative

annexation proposal to the City Commission which was considered
but rejected as contrary to the annexation laws.
24-26, at R.

.)

(Id., PP•

Although not overly active, Mr.

Watson also attended and participted in the public hearings
concerning annexation.

(Watson Depo., p. 16, at R. 827.)

The Plaintiff-Respondent Doenges was actively involvea
in the annexation process as he provided information to the
City Commission and Planning Connnission and attended the hearing:
And along the way I have also provided some
information to the City Commission and tried to
contribute to the digestion of the facts and
.
hearsay that our informal group has been advancing
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to the City Cornrnission and concerned neighbors.
(Doenges Depo., p. 8, at R.
•)
Mr. Doenges testified that he had subnitted documents and had
prepared typed testimony that were given to the City Commission
for consideration.

Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen also submitted

prepared, typed testimony to the City Corrn:lission.
Depo., p. 9, atR.

.)

(Doenges

Mr. Doenges testified that he, with

Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen, submitted "fairly voluminous documents"
to the City Commission which are part of the Public record stating
"engineering estimates and cost figures that we thought might
pertain based on our inspection of the survey uaps that would
bear on development feasibility relative to the proposed zoning
ordinance."

Doenges also testified that he made recommendations

to the City Commission for the appointment of a "blue ribbon
commission" to study total annexation of the Canyon.
Depo., p. 9, at R.

.)

(Doenges

It is interesting to note at this

point that the City Commission adopted Mr. Doenges and the other
Plaintiff-Respondents' recommendation that a "Blue Ribbon
commission" be appointed.

In the Mayor's motion to adopt the

recommendation of the Planning and Zoning Commission, as modified,
the Mayor moved that a "Blue Ribbon Corrn:lission" be established
to advise the Salt Lake City Planning Commission, as suggested
by Doenges, Bowen and others.
at R.

.)

(Mayor \Ji ls on Depo., Exhibit #1,

A "Blue Ribbon Co=ittee" was approved by the City

Commission.

(Letter from City Recorder to the City Commissioners,

April 10, 1979, Wilson Depo., Exhibit #4, at R.

.)

In addition to the oral testinony which was given at
the hearings, these three days, numerous letters, reports
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"1

and documents were also received which formed the basis for
the decision to vote in favor of annexation.

As Mayor

Wilson explained, there was,
A stack that was about three or four inches
thick and included recommendations from
various city departments and also included
recommendations from both developers and
Canyon residents.

It was also summarized by our department of
development services. (Wilson Depo. p. 31,
at R.
.)
During the period between the public hearings in
January of 1979, and the final vote in April of 1979, there
was considerable agitation in Emigration Canyon in an effort
to remove names from the petitions and re-add the171.

Representa·

tive of the Plaintiff-Respondents, Mr. Craig Smay, on at least
two occasions, sent letters to the residents of the Canyon
in an effort to pursuade them to remove their names from the
petitions favorinb annexation.
at R. 843-44, 52.)

(Gardner Det>O·, pp. 15-16, 24,

In the first instance, Mr. Smay informed the

residents of the Canyon that in certain circumstances if the
proposed zoning was adopted, the residents would not be
able to build on their existing lots.

(Gardner Depo. PP•

31, 15-16, 20-21, at R. 859, 843-44, 848-49.)

Mr. Smay also

suggested, in a letter to the residents of Emigration Canyon,
that if annexation were accomplished, the tax burden of the
residents in the annexed area would be greatly increased.
(Gardner Depo. pp. 24, 37, at R. 852, 865.)
Mr. Smay was busy attempting to get people to
withdraw their names from the petitions, Mr. Gardner, an
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employee of the Defendant-Appellant Emigration Properties
Partnership, was discussing with the residents of the Canyon
the value of annexation, (Gardner Depo., pp. 43-45, at R. 871873,) and attempting to get residents to re-sign petitions
for annexation. (Gardner Depo., p. 14, at R. 842.)
On April 10, 1979, Walter Miller of the City
Attorney's office, and representatives of Defendant-Appellants
met to review the petitions to determine the number of
signatures on the final petitions.
49, 50, at R. 876-78.)

(Gardner Depo. pp. 48-

Although expressly invited (Gardner

Depo. p. 53, at R. 881), Mr. Smay did not attend this meeting.
(Gardner Depo. p. 55, at 882.)

:a·

However, Mr. Miller of the City

Commission office did review a list of concerns submitted by
Mr. Smay to assure that the petitions met the statutory requirement.

(Gardner Depo. pp. 49-50, at R. 877-78.)

The City

Attorney's office determined that the petitions did meet the
statutory requirements:
he

I have reviewed the petitions for annexation
with Craig Smay, attorney for the plaintiffs in
the above action, and Dave Johnson, President of
Great Basin Title Company, retained by the
developers, and each has described the insuff~c~encies
or sufficiencies of the Emigration Canyon petitions
they respectively perceive. Based upon that review,
I am of the opinion that a majority of property
owners on each of the annexation petitions presently
favors connection to the City on the following
particulars:
Petition Ill
Petition 112
Petition 113

55.76%
100.00%
100.00%

The total property owners petitioning
represent, by my figures, 61.25% of all property
owners in the subject area. (Letter from Wally
-13-
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Miller, Deputy City Attorney to Board of City
Commissioners, April 10, 1979.) (Affidavit of
Mildred Higham, at R. 171-172.)
Prior to the actual vote, interested parties were

a~

given opportunity to present their views to the City Coramission.
Craig Smay spoke, and without making any specific objections,
claimed that the petition was not valid.

(Gardner Depo. p.

50, at R. 879; Craig Peterson Depo. p. 6, at R. 823; Wilson
Depo p. 30, at R.

•)

A city's purpose for being is to:
Provide for the safety, preserve the health,
promote the prosperity and improve the morals
peace, order, comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants. (U.C.A. § 10-8-2.)
After extensive hearings and investigations, the City Commissio
concluded that annexation would accomplish these purposes and
protect the entire Canyon community.

Therefore, after all

interested parties had been heard, the Mayor moved that
Report No. 90 of the Public Planning and Development Commission
be filed and with certain recommendations annexation of the
portion of Emigration Canyon encompassed within the petitions
be approved.

(Mayor Wilson Depo., Ex. l, at R.

motion carried unanimously.

(Ibid.)

,)

The Mayor

The City Attorney was

directed to prepare the necessary ordinances and contracts
consistent with the proposed zoning ordinance necessary to
implement annexation.

(Mayor Wilson De po., Ex. 4, at R.

The Mayor's motion carried unanimously.

(Ibid.)

.)

The City

Attorney was directed to prepare the necessary ordinances a~
contracts consistent with the proposed zoning ordinance

-14-
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necessary to implement annexation.
4, at R.

(Mayor Wilson Depa., Exhibit

.)
D.

The Plaintiff-Respondents have Neither Claimed nor

Shown an Injury Resulting fror~ the Provisions of Section 10-2-401.
No claims have ever been made, either in the complaint or by
way of any evidentiary submissions that any of the plaintiffs
in this case have suffered a protectable injury as a direct result
of the petition provisions of Section 10-2-401.
In their Complaint filed on April 1, 1979, and
their Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief filed April 26, 1979, plaintiffs alleged as a practical
matter, two causes of action--that the Salt Lake City Commission
had not considered the evidence submitted and if this evidence
were properly considered, annexation would not be decreed, and
that the petition provision of the statute was unconstitutional.
The Plaintiff-Respondents include four residents of
Enigration Canyon and the Emigration Improvement District.
The latter certainly will not be injured by annexation.

In

fact, the Emigration Improvement District does not oppose
annexation and by letter dated July 26, 1979, requested that
it be withdrawn as a party plaintiff because "annexation of
the canyon by Salt Lake City would facilitate the purposes of
the Improvement District."

(R. 538.)

Plaintiff-Respondent Carl

Peterson is a university student and renter living within the
area to be annexed.

He did not become involved in opposing

annexation until after the City Commission voted to annex
the area on April 10, 1979.

At that time, his landlord, who

-15-
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opposed annexation and who had ci1e right to sign or refuse
to sign the petition, asked Mr.

Peterson if he would be

willing to be a plaintiff in this action.
He [the landlord] asked or had told me that
someone had called and asked if they knew of anyone
renting in the area, and they of course knew
that I was there, and they had said that he would
ask me if I would be willing to participate in
this [action]. (Carl Peterson Depo. p. 5, lines
21-24, at R. 826.)

Mr. Peterson was told that if he was willing to help he should
call Mr. Smay.

(R. 826 at 6.)

Although now named as a

plaintiff, Mr. Peterson had no other involvement.
paying counsel to represent him.

He is not

(R. 826, Id. at 9.)

At his

deposition he only claimed that he opposed annexation because
that if people wanted the city services they should
downtown.

mov~

(R. 826 Id. at 7.)
Mr. Crockard lives in the area to be annexed,

participated in all of the hearings, and under the statute
had a right to sign or refuse to sign the petition for annexal
Mr. Crockard refused.

He certainly was not and could not be

adversely affected by the provisions of § 10-2-401 as he is
included within those individuals who may petition the
Commission to investigate the possibility of annexation.
Mr. Crockard's only complaint and only claim to injury was
that annexation would cause a change in his lifestyle.
(Crockard Depo. pp. 16, 18, at R. 972, 974.)
Plaintiff-Respondent William Bowen lives within Emi
Canyon, but not within the area to be annexed.

From the

inception of the annexation movement, he has been very

-16-
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active in opposing annexation.

He claimed no injury to himself.

He feared that small property owners living within the
annexed area would not be able to build.
9-10, at R.

•)

(Bowen Depo., pp •

He also hoped that other areas would

.)

(Id., pp. 6-7, at R.

be included within annexation.

At all times, Mr. Bowen was represented at the hearings and
participated personally.

In fact, Mr. Bowen met with the Mayor

to present an alternative plan for annexation.
pp. 18, 27-28, at R.

(Bowen Depo.

; Doenge3 Depo. p. 9, at R.

.)

Finally, the Plaintiff-Respondent Richard Watson is a
resident within the area to be annexed who had purchased property
within Emigration Canyon after November, 1978, (Watson Depo.
p. 4, at R. 827.)

His name did not appear on "the last

assessment rolls" as those rolls had been prepared prior to
his purchase of the property.

Mr. Watson opposes annexation

because the property he owns contains an easement for a road,
which he was aware of when he purchased the property.
p. 10, at R. 827.)

If development in the annexed areas takes

place, he fears that road will be built.

827.)

(Id.,

(Id., P• 10, at R.

In addition, Mr. Watson opposes annexation because it

would mean increased taxes, split neighborhoods, and the
requirement to connect to the City sewer and water systems.
(Id., p. 10, at R. 827.)
Smay, who participated

Mr. Watson is represented by Craig
at the public hearings convened to

consider the annexation proposal.
at R. 827.)

(Watson Depo., P• 9-10,

Finally, the Plaintiff-Respondent Peter Doenges

was extensively involved in the hearings on annexation.

He
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prepared and submitted studies and, with others, reviewed
reports submitted by proponents of annexation.

In fact, Mr.

Doenges testified that his submissions were "fairly voluminous",
(Doenges Depo., p. 9, at R.
1.

.)

No evidence of injury was ever presented to the

cou,
--.;

On April 17, 1979, Judge Durha1:i granted Plaintiffs' motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that unless
annexation were enjoined before it was completed, Plaintiffs
would lose their standing to challenge annexation.

No

evidence was presented at this hearing.
On May 29, 1979, Judge Croft heard Defendants'
motions to dismiss the Complaint and to dissolve the Temporary
Restraining Order.

(Partial Transcript of Proceedings of

May 29, 1979, pp. 4, 14 & 15, at R. 1044, 1053-54.)

Judge

Croft found that the plaintiffs had not stated a claira nor

shown

any irreparable damage as a result of the annexation procedure.
THE COURT: It simply gets back to, well maybe
you can state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, but I don't think you have done so yet.
And therefore, I find difficulty in
reading into your Complaint a claim upon which
injunctive relief can be granted. (Partial
Transcript of Proceedings of May 29, 1979 Hearing,
P. 2, at R. 1042.)
THE COURT: Before we get to that, you see, we
have got to get you into court properly and
they have challenged the validity of your Complaint.
Maybe I read more into it than is there. I
think it can be summed up, as I said before, you
don't state a claim upon which the relief you
seek can be granted. (Partial Transcript of
Proceedings of May 29, 1979 Hearing, p. 4, at
R. 1043.)
THE COURT:
. . . I think that your claim
for relief under 6S(b) ought to be clearly and
concisely stated if you are going to rely upon
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65(b). If you are going to rely upon 65(a), I
think you have got to do something more than you
have done to allege irreparable damage to the
plaintiffs that would justify injunctive relief.
(Id., p. 14, at R. 1053.)
Plaintiff-Respondents filed a Second Amended Complaint
on June 7, 1979.

In this Second Amended Complaint, as suggested

by the court, the plaintiffs stated two causes of action--the
first that the petition was defective and that the City Commission
had acted improperly, and the second that the petition provisions
of § 10-2-401 violated the equal protection requirements of
both the Federal and State Constitutions.

All claims for

injunctive relief were dropped fron the Second Amended
Complaint and there were no allegations whatsoever that any of
the plaintiffs had been injured in any way.

The o::ily claim

alleged was that the act of annexation would:
affect the rights of plaintiffs in that lands
in which plaintiffs hav.e the interest heretofore
set forth will be subjected, as the result of
such acts, to the jurisdiction of Salt Lake City,
including, at least, the jurisdiction to tax and
assess and to plan and develop. (PlaintiffRespondents' Second Amended Complaint, p. 4, at R. 362.)
This claim for damages was only alleged as a consequence of the
City Commission's acts of annexation.

The Plaintiff-Respondents

made no claim that the provisions of Section 10-2-401 either
directly or adversely affected the rights of the Plaintiff,
except the blanket claim that Plaintiffs had been denied equal
protection.

(Id. p. 4-5, at R. 362-63.)

All of the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment and submitted the issue to the judge after hearing on
August 9, 1979.

No witnesses were offered, no testimony taken
-19-
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except whatever was contained in the depositions and affidavits
on file.
At the hearing, Judge Conder also questioned the
Plaintiffs' claim to damages and asked Mr. Smay, attorney for
Plaintiffs in which way the Plaintiffs had been injured.

The

only reference in the Complaint or in any of the documents filea
or argument given to possibility of an injury is the following:
THE COURT: Thank you. Second question. Under
Rule 65(a) which is injunctive relief, and this
is going to come up by rea3ons of the other
motions in the file, do you claim there is
irreparable harm caused to the plaintiffs and have
you pled irreparable harm caused to you to warrant
the issuance of a preliminary injunction?

MR. SHAY:

Yes, clearly irreparable harT'.1, and
it is recognized in a number of cases having the
status of your land in which you're interested
change from one authority to another counter
[center] to the city is irreparable harm, if in
fact it Houldn' t be illegal. ('i'ranscript of
Proceedings, August 9, 1979, pp. 48-49, at
R. 1103-04.)
The right to remain part of the county is not a right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
There has been no showins of any claimed injury to
any recognizable right resulting directly from the petition
provisions of Section 10-2-401.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Plaintiff-Respondents do not have Standing

to Challenge the Constitutionality of Section 10-2-401,
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 1977) as the provisions of
that Section have not and will not "directly and adversely"
Infringe on any of their Constitutionally Protected Rights.
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Neither this Court nor any other court has the pm 7er, per
se, to review and annul acts of the legislature on the
grounds that they are unconstitutional.

That question nay

be considered only when some direct injury is suffered or
threatened to be suffered by the one assailing the act.
The party who invokes the power must be able
to show, not only that the statute is invalid,
but that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally. (Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923).)
The controlling question determining standing is whether
Plaintiff-Respondents "have sustained or are immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury "as a result of the
statute's enforcement.

(Cramp v. Bd. of Public Inst., 368 U.S.

278, 279 (1961).)
This being a declaratory judgment action in which the
requirements for standing are strict, (Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44,45 (1943).), before any court has jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality of the statute, it must
deterDine whether the parties had the requisite standing.
Plaintiff-Respondents must have suffered or will suffer in fact
an actual and direct injury as a result of the petition provisions
of Section 10-2-401 in order to challenge its constitutionality.
We may once more repeat what has been so
often said, that one who would strike down
a state statute as violative of the Federal
Constitution must show he is within the
class with r~spect to whom the act is
unconstitutional, and must show that the
alleged unconstitutional feature injures
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him, and so operates as to deprive him of
rights protected by the Federal Constitution.
(The Plymouth Coal CompanJ v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 531, 545 (1913).
Clearly, Plaintiffs cannot sue for wrongs that do not affect
them.
In order that the validity of a state statute
may be "drawn in question" it must appear that
the plaintiff in error has a right to draw it
in question by reason of an interest in the
litigation which has suffered, or may suffer,
by the decision of the state court in favor of
the validity of the statute.
(Tyler v. Judges,
179 U.S. 405, 408 (1900).)
The issue was squarely addressed by the United Stnu
Supreme Court in Tileston v. Ullman.

There a physician

filed a declaratory judgment action in the state court to
determine whether the state statute prohibiting the use of
drugs or instruments to prevent conception and the giving of
assistance or counsel in their use is unconstitutional.

The

physician alleged that if the statute was enforced he would
be prohibited from giving advice concerning the use of
contraceptives to three patients whose condition of health was
such that their lives would be endangered by child bearing.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the action claiming
that the plaintiff's life was not in danger and therefore he
did not have standing.
We are of the opinion that the proceedings
in the State Court present no constitutional
question which appellant has standing to assert.
The sole constitutional attack upon the statutes
under the Fourteenth Amendment is confined to
their deprivation of life--obviously not
appellant's, but his patients'. There is no
allegation or proof that appellant's life is
in danger. His patients are not parties to

-22-
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these proceedings and there is no basis on which
we_ ca~ sa~ that he has standing to secure an
adJudication of his patients' constitutional
right to life, which they do not assert in their
owr: beh~lf. [cites omitted] No question is
rais~d i~ the record wit~ respect to the
~eprivation o~ appellant s liberty or property
in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment.
• • • (Tileston v. Ullr.ian, 318 U.S. 44, at 46.)
Not only must the plaintiffs personally suffer a
direct and recognizeable injury, the injury r.iust be pleaded.
In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429

{1961), the Suprer.ie

Court refused to consider the constitutional issue rising under
the First Amendment of a Sunday closing law as that constitutional right had not been alleged in the complaint by the
particular plaintiffs:
First, appellants contend here that the statutes
applicable to Anne Arundel County violate the
constitutional guarantee of Freedom of Religion
in that the statutes' effect is to prohibit the
free exercise of religion in contravention of
the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But appellants
allege only economic injury to theraselves; they
do not allege any infringement of their own
religious freedoms due to Sunday closing. In fact,
the record is silent as to what appellants'
religious beliefs are. Since the general rule
is that "a litigant may only assert his own
constitutional rights or immunities," United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, we hold that appellants
have no standing to raise this contention.
These principles are dispositive of the action.

Plaintiff-

Respondents never pleaded, nor attempted to prove that they had
suffered a direct injury to a constitutionally protected right
as a result of the annexation procedure dictated by Section

10-2-401.

The Plaintiffs in their Complaint claim that the

statute is unconstitutional in:

-23-
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(a) That the annexation procedure limits the
petition process of an annexation to land owners
of record on the latest assessment rolls while
denying to others the right to sign the petition;
(b) That the requirement that those signing
the petition include a majority of the property
owners results in weighted voting; and
(c) The use of the last assess~ent rolls grants
a right to individuals who have sold their property
subsequent to the completion of the rolls to sign
a petition while denying the opportunity to
purchasers who purchase the property subsequent to
the formulation of the latest assessment rolls.
(Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, p. 5,
, 13, at R. 363.)
Plaintiffs argued that "defendant has attempted to impose its
jurisdiction upon lands in which plaintiffs are interested
by proceedings taken pursuant to a statute which is unconstitutl
and void.

(Ibid., ~ 14, at R. 363.)
Thus, the only claimed injury is the changing of

the status of Plaintiffs' land from being land in the county
to land in the city.

This being true,

the only Plaintiffs

conceivably having standing to assert this injury are the
Plaintiffs who own property within the area to be annexed-Doenges, Crockard and Watson.

Miles Crockard and Peter

Doenges, however, had an opportunity to sign the petition or
refuse to.

(Doenges Depo., pp. 4-5, at R.

.)

Therefore, the

petition provisions of Section 10-2-401 do not deny them any
right.

"He who is not injured by the operation of a law or

ordinance cannot be said to be deprived by it of either
constitutional right or property."

(Thomas Cusack Co. v.

Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530 (1916).)
Plaintiff-Respondent Watson, at his deposition,
alleged that he purchased property within the area to be
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annexed in approx~nately November, 1978, after the assessment
rolls were determined.

(Watson Depa., p. 4, R. 827.)

Therefore,

his name did not appear and he could not sign the petition.
Equal Protection does not require perfection
407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).)
annexation.

But,

(Janes v. Strange,

Mr. Bowen, however, favored

He wanted more area included within the annexation.

(Bowen Depa., pp. 5-6, at R.
else's property.

.)

His interest was in someone

A right he does not have standing to assert.

Bowen will not be personally injured by the exclusion of
this area from the city.
known at the hearings.

Further, Mr. Bowen made his opinions
Hr. Peterson, a renter, did not have

his property transferred to city jurisdiction.

Thus, he could

not have suffered this alleged injury.
The Emigration Improvement District certainly had
no constitutional right to protect.

First, in a letter to the

court dated July 26, 1979, the Improvement District adnitted
that annexation would accomplish its purpose in being and asked
to be removed as a plaintiff.

(R.538.)

It certainly could

not be injured if its purposes were being accomplished by
annexation.

And there is certainly no right for a water

district to vote in any election or as a district to sign any
petition.

Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen lives outside the area

to be annexed, none of this property would be transferred into
the city's jurisdiction.

He opposed the annexation because

it did not include the area in which he resides.
The Plaintiffs did not carry their burden or even
ic1akc• .my

effort to show that the use of the latest assessment
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rolls created an invidious distinction.

(See, infra, at 40.)

There must be a way to finally determine potential petitioners
so that the City Commission can finally know whether it can
act.

A city commission cannot take action unless the requisite

number of signatures are on a petition.

Without some standard

of establishing finality in ownership, it would be impossible
for the commissioners to determine whether, on the date of
voting on an annexation petition, the requisite number of
signatures were present.

The Commission is not equipped to

review every parcel of land to determine property ownership
on the very day of the vote.

Petitioners also have a right

to know whether their petition is valid, and with whom they

must deal to petition a city cor.imission to commence determinatio:
of the advisability of annexation.

The latest assessment rolls

are the best deterr.iiners.
B.

Equal Protection is not Violated by Limiting the

Petition Process Trig,gering a Hearing to Consider a Petition
for Annexation to Real Property Ownen. where the Hearing Process
Grants to all Interested Individuals an Opportunity to be Heard
on the Annexation Petition.
1.

Plaintiff-Respondents have neither

plead~rn

proven a direct and adverse infringement on any constitutionall:
protected right.
In this sense, the concept of standing focuses
on the party seeking relief, rather than on
the precise nature of the relief sought. See
Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U.S., at 99-100._
The decisions of this court have also made it
clear that something more than an "adversary
interest" is necessary to confer standing.

-26-
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There must, in addition, be some connection
between the official action challenged and some
legally ~rotected interest of the party challenging
that action. See Flast v. Cohen supra at
101-106. (Jenkins v. McKeethan '395 U.S. 411
423 (1969).)
,
,
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Section 10-2-401
of the Utah Code denies the "franchise to other persons
substantially affected by and interested in the annexation.''
(Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, p. 5 ~ 13A, at R. 363.)
The right infringed would be the right to be heard.

But such

is not the effect of this provision.
Section 10-2-401 provides that a majority of landovmers
within a given area may request, by way of petition, that a
city commission investigate and determine the advisability
of the annexation of that territory to the municipality.

This

petition does not determine whether annexation will take
place.

It is merely a triggering device which triggers

consideration of the proposal by the body legislated by the
state to make that determination.

Immediately upon receiving

a valid petition, the city commission must investigate and
consider the petition.

This investigation and consideration

includes public hearings.

In the present case numerous

public hearings were held wherein all interested citizens,
including the Plaintiffs and their representative, were
allowed to participate and to make their views known.
at 9-13.)

(Supra,

The determination of annexation was made by the

City Commission only after the opinions and views of all
parties who had availed themselves of the opportunity to

-27-
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speak had been heard.

The effect of Section 10-2-401 is to

grant to everyone the equal right to be heard on any proposed
annexation during the hearing process.
It is clear that the constitutional validity of a
statute must be determined by its natural and reasonable
effects.
With respect to these contentions, it is
enough to say that in passing upon constitutional
questions the Court has regard to substance and not
mere matters of form, and that, in accordance
with familiar principles, the statute must be
tested by its operation and effect.
(Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).)
In Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932),
Chief Justice Hughes explained exactly how an alleged denial
of equal protection must be weighed by the court.
Discrimination, like interstate commerce itself,
is a practical concept. We must deal in this
matter, as in others with substantial distinctions
and real injuries.
(Id., at 481.)

The same considerations, with respect to discrimination applied to the claim that the statute
in question volates the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

In determining whether there is a denial of
equal protection of the laws by such taxation,
we r.rust look to the fairness and reasonableness
of its purposes and practical operation. . . •
(Id., at 482.)
Looking at the purposes and practical operation, of Section
10-2-401, it is obvious that the plaintiffs in this case
have suffered no real injuries.

They had, and availed thernselv

of the opportunity to be heard.

See pages 6-13, supra.
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The record clearly shows that the Plaintiff-Respondents
have not been denied equal protection, have not been denied
an equal right to be heard on the annexation provisions.

What

has happened is that the Plaintiff-Respondents have lost in
the political process and are now attempting judicially to reverse
what the legislature lawfully has accomplished.

In Thompson v.

Whitley, 344 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972), a similar situation
occured.

Here, under a statutory annexation scheme, residents

within the area to be annexed were denied the right to vote
on an annexation referendum.

In finding that such a scheme

was constitutional, the district court explained:
• • • thus right to vote in the referendum here
does not relate except indirectly to participation
in representative government. Indeed, the newly
annexed citizens brought into the township over
their protests may thereafter vote in township
elections and have their votes counted fully to
influence township decisions---including future
annexations and perhaps even de-annexations.
(Id., at 484.)
The Utah statute grants more.
2.

Plaintiff-Respondents have not been denied

any constitutionally protected right to vote.
In Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978), a
case squarely on point, the Fourth Circuit held that a law under
which the governing body of a city may annex an area by
resolution upon the filing of a petition signed by a certain
percentage of the landowners within that area does not deny
equal protection to anyone.

The South Carolina statute in

question authorized the 8overning body of any city, upon the
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....,

filing of a petition by seventy-five percent or more of the
freeholders in any area contiguous to the city requesting
annexation, to annex such area.

The registered voter denied the

right to vote on the annexation filed suit alleging that this
denial violates voters' rights under the equal protection clause.
In denying the claim, relying on Hunter v. Pittsbur 8,
207 U.S. 161 (1907). the Fourth Circuit held that no one was
denied the right to vote as the decision was made by the
city's governing body.

The court held that the petitioning

process "involves no election" (Id., at 425) and therefore the
Court expressly rejected the application of Kramer v. Union Scho:.
District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) and Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969), (Id., at 424), cases relied on by the PlaintiffRespondents in the court below.

Where no one is granted the

right to vote on an annexation "there is no basis for an equal
protection claim."

(Berry, supra, at 424; See also, Citizens

Comm. to Opp. Annex. v. City of Lynchburg, Va., 400 F.Supp.
68, modified on other grounds, 528 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1975),
~denied,

423 U.S. 1043 (1976).)

The procedure examined by the Fourth Circuit in Berry
is precisely the procedure mandated by Section 10-2-401.
is no election.

There

Upon the petition of a majority of the land-

owners, the city commission may annex contiguous areas upon
adoption of an appropriate resolution.

There is no basis for

an equal protection claim.
This Court reached the same conclusion in Freeman v.
Centerville City, et al., No. 15904 (Utah Sup. Ct. September
21, Sponsored
1979.)
Freeman,
was
annexed to
by the S.J.In
Quinney
Law Library. FundingPlaintiff's
for digitization provided by the property
Institute of Museum and
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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annexed to the City of Centerville by an ordinance passed by
that municipality.

Freeman made the exact same claim of injury

as the Plaintiffs in this case.

The Plaintiff opposed annexation

on the ground that Section 10-2-401 was unconstitutional.

The

Court disagreed.
Plai~tiff specifically claims a deprivation
of his property because annexation to a different
jurisdiction will significantly alter his property
rights in connection with such matters as annexation
zoning, and water rights. (Id., at 2.)
'

This Court found that the legislature was under no legal requirement
to provide for an election by those affected by the proposed
annexation.

(Id., at 3-4.)

The Supreme Court concluded, after

reviewing the statute,
We find no basis in the Constitution for
making the general annexation process subject to
conditions beyond those stated in the statute.
(Id., at 4.)
The Court went on to explain that the annexing municipality,
in considering a petition, was required to consider all
interests involved and it was not bound by the petition.
It is, howev~r. the duty and responsibility
of the annexing municipality to exercise the
prudence and sound judgment that will prevent
inappropriate annexations and assure that they
are in the public interest. The governing
body of the municipality must take into account
not only the welfare of the petitioners, but also
the welfare of those who reside within its
established borders in determining whether to
pass an ordinance of annex~tion. Acco7dingly! a
municipality is not bound in the exer7ise of its
judgment by a petition, even though si~ned by a
majority of landowners, to pass an ordinance
necessary to complete annexation. Cottonwood
City Electors v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Cornrn'rs,
28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972). (Id., at 5.)
Since no one voted for or against annexation except the City
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Commission, no group could claim that it had been denied equal
protection.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Hall explained that
as the plaintiff had actual notice of the hearing, and was in
attendance, he therefore had no standing to challenge the
lack of notice.

The situation is similar here.

Plaintiff-

Respondents all had notice of the hearing, all participated
in the hearings and made their opinions known, they now have
no standing to challenge the process.

As explained in

Freeman, the petitioning process is not the same as an
election.

It is only the triggering process for the considerati~

of annexation and therefore the equal protection requirements
for a direct election do not apply.
As this Court recognized in Freeman, the annexation
procedure of Section 10-2-401 provides first that a majority
of the landowners living within an area desirin8 annexation
must request of the annexing territory that it consider the
prospects of annexation.

This petition is merely a

triggeri~

device and not an election.
In enacting § 10-2-401, the Legislature
established a means for annexation which calls
for the consent of both the annexing municipality
and a majority of the property owners in the area
seeking annexation. The initiation of the
annexation process by petition is not the
equivalent of an election nor need it be. It
is only the triggering process for the concerned
municipality to consummate the annexation procedure
by exercising its legislative power if it deems it
appropriate to do so.
(Freeman v. Centerville Cit
et al., No. 15904 Utah Sup. Ct.
Septera er
1979).) (Emphasis supplied)
This was the point missed by Plaintiff-Respondents and the
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court below.

In reliance on constitutional requirements

established by cases where the election was the final determinative act, the lower court held that a "triggering" petition
was equivalent and required the same protections.

This simply

is not correct.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed this
same issue in Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio v. Pine
Creek Conservancy District, 429 U.S. 651 (1977).

Under the

Ohio statute in question, the filing of a petition signed by
a certain percentage of the owners of land located within the
the area desiring to form a conservancy district triggered the
forr.1ation of a conservancy court.

It was the conservancy court's

responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing
the proposed district and then to decide whether one should
be formed.

The petition of the landowners did not create the

district, but only initiated consideration of the matter.
Following this process, in the Concerned Citizens case, the
conservancy court determined that a conservancy district ought
to be established.
Parties objecting to the formation of the district,
landowners and non-landowners alike, argue that the procedure
violated the Coustitution, inter alia, on the ground that
residents of towns opposing formation of the district were
denied equal protection because they were excluded from the
petition process.

The three-judge district court rejected

plaintiff's claims without consideration.

The Supreme Court

reversed and remanded Per Curium, stating that the three-

-33-
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judge court needed to evaluate each of the constitutional
challenges.
In dissent, Justices Rhenquist, Powell and Stevens
argued that this would be a waste of time, for following
correct authority the lower court would have arrived at the
same result.

Dealing specifically with the question of the

equal protection requirement of an individual's right to be
heard in opposition, the three agreed:
To the extent the claim here protests the
"discrimination" against the freeholders in a
town whose governing body signs the petition,
in that they "were deprived of the right to oppose
the district," it is sir.iply wrong on the facts .
• • • Rather, opposing freeholders in such towns
remain as free as opposing freeholders in towns
where petitions are circulated, to appear before
the conservancy court and "object to the organization and incorporation of said district. • • . 11
[cite omitted] They are entitled to no more
under the Constitution.
(Id., at 658)
(Emphasis
added.)
Other state courts reach the same conclusion.

The

S~

Court of New Mexico found constitutional an annexation provisim
excluding the petition process to landowners in Torres v. Villa_&
of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277 (1978).

The statute provi

that a city may annex contiguous territory whenever a petition
signed by the owners of a majority of the number of acres within
that area is filed.

A majority of the landowners and owners of

more than 50 percent of the area to be annexed filed a petition
for annexation.

After consideration the annexation was approvea,

A suit was filed challenging the annexation on the ground that
the exclusion of non-landowners from the petition and the
requirement that petitioners own more than 50 percent of the
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land within the area to be annexed violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
disagreed.

The New Mexico Supreme Court

The Court could not equate the petition procedure

triggering consideration by a municipality of an annexation proposal
with an individual's voting rights.

(Torres v. Village of

Capitan, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277, 1282 (1978).)
We hold that petitioning for annexation
land in this case is not a fundamental voting
right and that §14-7-17, supra, is constitutional.
(Id., at 1283.)
o~

In so holding, the court explained that these petition procedures
do not involve elections and therefore do not infringe upon
the fundamental right to vote."

(Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court also squarely met the
issue in Curtis v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County,
501 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1972).

The California statute being

challenged -- a municipal incorporation statute -- contained two
provisions separately considered uy the court.

One was a

determination of the constitutionality of the same procedure as
that mandated by the Utah Code Section 10-2-401, except for the
numbers required.

The California provision in question required:

Proceedings for municipal incorporation
were initiateJ by the "filing with the board of
supervisors • • • a petition signed by at least
25 percent of the qualified signers, representing
at least 25 percent of the assessed value of the
land included in the proposed city limits." (Id.,
at 540 n. 4.)
("Qualified signer" was defined as the "owner of an interest
in fee" or the purchaser of land under a written agreement.

(Ibid.).;

Excluded were all r,esidents who own no land "although these
persons ad~ittedly are also financially and politically interested. •
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(Id., at 545.)
The California Supreme Court found that limiting
the petition process to landowners did not deny non-landowners
their right to be heard.

0

It was not a denial of equal protectioi

As the court explained:
30. Section 34303 provides that proceedings before
the board of supervisors are initiated by a
petition signed by at least 25 percent of the landowners representing at least 25 percent of the
assessed value of land.
(See fn. 4, supra.)
We perceive no constitutional objection in
permitting a group composed of 25 percent or oore
of the landowners, whether or not they represent
25 percent of the value of land, to initiate
incorporation proceedings, and consequently we find
no constitutional impediment to the board of
supervisors acting on the petition for incorporation of Rancho Palos Verdes • • • • (Id., at 553 n. 30.)
31. Our holding that the protest procedure of
section 34311 is unconstitutional does not leave
the nonresident or corporate landowner bereft of
statutory protection.
He may appear before the
local agency formation coomssion to oppose incorporation and request exclusion from the proposed
city(§ 54795). These comoissions may, and often
do, disapprove unsound incorporation proposals
or require the revision of proposed boundaries.
The landowner may again appear before the board of
supervisors to oppose incorporatin or request
exclusion(§§ 34311, 34315) • • • •
The difference between these remedies and the
protest procedure of section 34311 is that they
confer upon the landowner no right to veto incorpora·
tion, but extend to him only the opportunity to
persu~de a public body that nonincorporation,
exclusion, or lower taxation is in the public
interest.
(Id., n. 31.)
The petition procedure in Utah, South Carolina, New
Mexico and California initiate hearings on the advisability
of annexation.

In no case is the petition determinative.

Plaintiffs had no right to vote on the annexation proposal.
Dealing specifically with claims similar to
those of plaintiffs, the courts have long held
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that there is no absolute right under the due

proces~ 7lause to vote on a proposed alteration

of p~litical boundaries. (Dozle v. Municiyal
Comm n, 340 F.Supp. 841, 847.I D.Minn. 1972 .)

of

See also, Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178, 179 (1907);

or

Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.Supp. 1397 (D.Colo.
1970); aff'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).

The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated
and reaffirmed that equal protection and due process do not
apply to annexation procedures that only trigger hearings and
a final decision is subsequently made, not compelled by the
petitioning process
3.

this decision being made by a separate body.

There is no constitutionally protected right

to maintain a person's property within or without a political
subdivision of the state.
In Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), the
United States Suprerne Court explained the "settled doctrines"
regarding a state's statutory authority over annexation.
Although the inhabitants and property owners may
by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their
property may be lessened in value by the burden
of increased taxation, or for any other reason,
they have no right by contract or otherwise in
the unaltered or continued existence of the
corporation or its powers, and there is nothing
in the Federal Constitution which protects them
from these injurious consequences. The power is
in the State and those who legislate for the State
are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive
exercise of it. (Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161,
178-79 (1907) .)
Although pronounced in 1907, the principle remains unaltered by
that Court and repeatedly followed.

1

1 see, ~· Board of Sup. of Harrison Co., Iowa v.
Bd. of Sup:-oI Pottawattomie Ct., Iowa, 289 U.S. 708 (1932);
~f Hillsboro v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 255 U.S. 562 (1920); City
~New-York v. McEntee, 263 U.S. 698 (1923).
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In affirl"ling a disnissal of a property owners' action
to have a municipal annexation ordinance declared invalid, the
Tenth Circuit, relyinr, on the Suprel"le Court's opinion in
Hunter, concluded that neither federal due process nor the
concept of equal protection was available to the plaintiffs.
Neither the due process clause nor the concept
of equal protection is available to persons seekinb
to obstruct the ordinary and necessary exercise
of a state's political functions . • . • (Internatioo~
Harvester Co. v. Kansas Gitt' 308 F.2d 35, 39
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. den d, 371 U.S. 948 (1963).)
The Sixth Circuit, again relying on Hunter, in

~

Edison Co. v. East China Township School Dist. No. 3, 37U F.2d
225 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. den'd, 389 U.S. 932 (1967), in
affirming the lower court, concluded:
The District Court, relying principally on
Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct.
40, 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907) for the proposition that
"[a]ny alteration of municpal boundaries is a matter
within the complete discretion of the state and not
confined by any rights secured by the federal constitu:
held that the annexation procedure followed was a
lesislative matter not justiciable under the due proc<
or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendmer.
(Id., at 228.)
In East China Township, the plaintiffs sought a declaration tha:
the annexation of two larger school districts to the school
district in which they owned property violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

Plaintiffs argued that

the statute was unconstitutional because the individual plaiAfU
were denied the right to vote on the annexation proposal.

The

Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal "because
plaintiffs have faile<l to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted."
-38-
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In Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 343 F.2d 162
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 837 (1965) the Fifth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion.

In Hammonds plaintiffs sued to

enjoin Corpus Christi from asserting any control over the alleged
annexed territory, alleging that the annexation violated the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution.

The district court

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction inter alia on the ground
that "(l) the annexation of lands to a city has been held, without
exception, to be purely a political matter entirely within the
power of the State Lesislature to regulate."

The Fifth Circuit

affirmed.
The appellants rely upon many cases dealing
with the protection afforded by the 14th Amendnent,
but none which specifically relate to an annexation
situation. The judge and appellee rely upon
Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 28
S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907). Although the judge
quoted at leneth from that opinion, appellants neither
cite the case nor make any attempt to distinguish it.
The Tenth Circuit, in International Harvester Co. v.
Kansas City, 308 F.2d 35, also cited with approval
and quoted from the Hunter case.
We find no error or fault in the opinion and
judgment of the district court, and they are
affirmed. (Id., at 164.)
Annexation is a political question--this district court lacked
power to review the City Commission's actions.
Although we may disagree with the mode of
annexation or annexations themselves, the remedy of
those aggrieved is not in the cour~s, but in the
State Legislature. (Hammonds v. City of Corpus
Christi, Texas, 226 F.Supp. 456 (S.D. Tex. 1964).)
None of the Plaintiff-Respondents either directly or
personally have been injured in areas protected by the
Constitution.

They had no risht to vote and their right to be

heard has been preserved and exercised through their participaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion in the hearings.

"They are entitled to no more under the

constitution."

Municipal corporations are political subdivision
of the state, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be entrusted to them. • • • Although
the inhabitants and property owners rnay by such
changes [changes in boundaries of municipalities)
suffer inconvenience and their property may be
lessened in value by increased taxation, or for
any reason, they have no right by contract or
otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence
of the corporation or its powers, and there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects
them froin these injurious consequences.
(Hunter v.
Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).)
It has been continually reaffirmed that the right to remain
outside a municipality or to be included within a municipality
is not a right protected under the Constitutuion.
We find no right of annexation available to
anyone, owners or residents, regardless of
economic status.
(Wilkerson v. City of Coralville,
478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1973).)
As the Supreme Court explained in Hunter,
The state • • • at its pleasure • • • may expand
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole
or a part of it with another municipality, repeal
the charter and destroy the corporation. All this
may be done conditionally or unconditionally with
or without the consent of the citizens or even
against their protest.
(Hunter v. Pittsburg,
207 U.S. at 179.)
There is no constitutional right to maintain ones property
within or without a municipality.
C.

Plaintiff-Respondents Failed to Sustain their

Burden of Showing that the State did not have a Compelling I~
in Limiting the Petitioning Provisions of the Utah Annexation
Statute to " • • • a majority of the owners of real propertyJ
shown by the last assessment rolls,

" of the Property ~

within the Area to be Annexed.
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The test for whether a state's statutory scheme
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is whether the classification drawn is reasonable in light of
its purpose.
the state."

"The presumption of reasonableness is with
(Salsbury v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954).)

It is • • • a maxim of constitutional law that a
legislature is presumed to have acted within
constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the
facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests
of the people as a whole, and courts will not
lightly hold that an act duly passed by the
legislature was one in enactment of which it has
transcended its power. (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104-105 (1898).
This presumption of reasonableness means this:
[T]he burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails
it, and • • • courts may not declare a legislative
discrimination invalid unless, viewed in light of
facts made known or generally assumed, it is of
such a character to preclude the assumption that
the classification rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators. A statutory discrimination uill
not be set aside as a denial of equal protection
of the laws if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it. (Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownel, 294 U.S. 580,
584 (1934) .)
This Court does not view this any differently:
In addressing the question of constitutionality of this act of the legislature,
we bear in mind the fundamental precepts:
that all presumptions favor validity; the courts
will strike down such an act with reluctance
and only where that is clearly necessary; and
that in case of uncertainty the act should be
construed so that it will be constitutional
whenever that reasonably can be done. (Great
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co.,
18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966).)
ln }:hompson v. Whitley, 344 F.Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972), the
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tionality and reasonableness were not applicable where a
statutory scheme denied them a fundamental right--the right
to vote on an annexation.

Al though the court in Thompson agreeo

that the plaintiffs "suffer discrimination by this statutory
scheme",

(Id., at 484.) it disagreed that voting on annexation

was a "fundamental right" and would not apply the stricter
standards of review.

(Ibid.)

In this case, although the Plaintiff-Respondents
claim that they and others in different circumstances and
situations have been denied equal protection because they
have not been allowed to participate in the triggering
process.

They have done nothing to show that this distinction

is invidious.

It was the Plaintiff-Respondents' burden to

show that the classification violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
and this burden they have not sustained.
Although it may not be perfect, the annexation
ordinance establishes safeguards--those entitled to petition
are those individuals primarily affected by the proposed
annexation.

The safeguards are embodied in the requirement

that the signers must be property owners appearing on the
last assessment rolls.

This requirement establishes a

method of determining the true owner, it establishes finality.
This assures that there is some relationship between the
petitioners and the tax burden.
The real property owners have the greatest interest
in the property rights affected.

They will be directly

affected by increased taxes or required improvements such as
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sewage connections.
to renters.

These costs may or may not be passed on

And the real property owners will be the ones

most benefited as the value of the property may increase

y

ion

with the advent of city services.

Fire insurance will

decrease as there will be a fire station closer to the
property.

Clean running water will be available.

Thus,

there is a basis for distinguishing between property owners
and non-property owners.

The classification is founded

upon a reasonable distinction, and although this Court nay
have a better idea that is not the standard for finding a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ion

Capitan, 92 N.W. 64, 582 P.2d 1277, 1283 (1978).)
D.

eM,

(Torres v. Village of

After a Notice of Appeal is Filed, the District

Court had no Jurisdiction over the Matter to File Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The law is clear that once a notice of appeal has been

n

filed, the district court loses jurisdiction of the matter
except to entertain motions necessary to facilitate the appeal
which are pending at the time the notice of appeal was filed.
On August 20, 1979, Judge Dean Conder of the Utah
State Third Judicial Court entered his Memorandum Decision on

ty.

the cross-motions for summary judgment which were argued before
the court on August 9, 1979.

In the order, the court held that

Section 10-2-401 was unconstitutional, therefore, the court
st

granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

Nowhere in

the Memorandum Decision did the court request the filing of
s

Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law.

As this Court is
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well aware, where there is no request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on a motion for summary judgment where
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not required by
statute, it is presumed that the court did not intend to
enter any, and that the Memorandum Decision was the final decisi:
Plaintiffs appealed before specifically
designated findings and conclusions were
entered by the trial court, allegedly in the
interest of time. Neither of the parties
challenged this on appeal; indeed, both treat
the memorandum decision as the court's final
disposition of the case. Generally, where no
request has been made for findings of fact, the
presumption is that the trial court found all
facts necessary to support its order and
judgment.
(Seal v. Ma¥leton City, No. 15948
(Utah Sup.Ct. 27 July 979).)
Due to the statutory requirements that the notice of appeal
be filed within 10 days, on August 27, 1979, these Defendants,
filed a notice of appeal (R. 748-49) in the district court fw
the Third Judicial District.
submitted

Findin~s

to the Court.

Eight days later, plaintiffs

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

Two days after that a second unrequested set of

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted.

These

were signed September 6, 1979.
The law is clear, that once a notice of appeal has
been filed the district court is without authority to enter
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial court's

jurisdiction ceased upon perfection of an appeal and jurisdictW
of the Utah Supreme Court attaches.
It is the general rule
loses jurisdiction while an
except in regard to matters
furtherance of the appeal.

that the trial court
appeal is pending
which will be in
(State v. Torres,
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510 P.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1973)· National
American Life Insurance Co. v. Baxter, 385 P.2d
956 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 1963).)
Whenever an appeal is perfected • • • it stays all
~urther proceedings in the court below upon the
Judgment or order appealed fro1n, or upon matters
embraced therein. • • but the court below may
proceed upon any other matters embraced in the
action and not affected by the order appealed
from.

The perfectin of an appeal is completed
when the formalities prescribed by the Rules on
Appeal are complied with, and "stays all further
proceedings in the court below" since jurisdiction
is thence forth vested in the appellate court.
(Navarro v. Lippold, 195 P.2d 543 (D. Ct. of App.
Cal. 1948).)
This applies to the entry of findings of fact and conclusions
of law after a notice of appeal has been filed.
In Mirabal v. Robert E. McKee General
Contractor, Inc., 74 N.JI. 455, 394 P.2d 851
(1964), we held that the trial court properly
refused to pass upon requested findings and
conclusions filed after the filing of the
notice of appeal, because the trial court had
lost jurisdiction to do so. It follows logically
therefrom that the trial court in the present
case lacked authority to enter findings and
conclusions 19 days after the filing of the
notice of appeal and over a month and a half
after the entry of judgment. (Universit~ of
Albuquerque v. Barrett, (86 N.M. 794), 5 8 P.2d
207, 209 (1974).)
Likewise, the district court in this case lacked authority to
enter findings and conclusions 10 days after the filing of a
notice of appeal and almost a month after the entry of judgment.
E.

The Court Erred in Failing to Grant Defendant-

~pellants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Dissolve the

Temporary Restraining Order.

-45-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

Annexation is a political matter wholly

within the power of the Legislature to regulate.
As this Court recently recognized in Freeman, supra,
The power to change or modify municipal
boundaries is a legislative function, and as long
as the statutory process is complied with, the
courts will not generally interfere with the
legislative prerogative, even though a person's
property by becoming subject to a different
jurisdiction may be subject to different rules,
obligations, or assessments. Bradshaw v. Beaver
City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972); see
also In Re Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391,
326 P.2d 105 (1958); Application of Peterson,
92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937); Plutus Mining
Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P.2d 132 (1930);
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1
(1899). Cf. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161 (1907); Dillon on Municipal Corporations
(5th Ed.) 617, §355. (Freeman, suµra, at 3.)
A court's role in reviewing decisions of governing bodies of
municipalities in annexation cases is limited by the political
nature of those proceedings.

In an action to restrain the

County Commissioners of Juab County from exerting authority
over territory segregated for a municipality, this Court
explained:
In view of the fact, however, that the changing
of the territorial limits of a city is primarily a
legislative function, courts are bound to confine
the e::.::ercise of the pm1er conferred upon then by the.
Legislature within the expressed or necessarily i~W
language of the act so conferring such power. (~
Mininr co. v. Orme, 76 Uta!. 286, 289 P.132, 135
(1930 • )
Further, courts are without authority to decide the "propriety"
or the "desirability" of a particular annexation.
Annexation is a legislative function which under
the constitutional separation of powers cannot be
delegated to the courts except for this narrow f~ct
finding determination. The court has no discretionar
power to determine whether the proposal is good or
-46-
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if

bad, wise or unwise. (Citl of Clinton v. Owners of
Property, 191 N.W.2d 671, 77 (Iowa 1971.)
The function of the judiciary is merely to make a determination
as to whether the conditions prescribed by the legislature for
annexation have been met.

The political and economic advisability

of annexation, and the policy questions involved in the
proble~

of municipal expansion, are to be determined solely

by the legislative branch and the municipalities, if the power
is so delegated.
The courts are and should be reluctant to
intrude into the prerogative of the legislative
branch of government, and will interfere with such
action only if it plainly appears that it is so
lacking in propriety and reason that it must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary, or is in excess of
the authority of the legislative body. (Bradshaw v.
Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643, 645 (1972).
See, also, Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d
184 (Utah, 1975); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d
127 (Utah 1950).)
This Court explained this principle in Tygesen v.
Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127 (Utah 1950).

Tygesen, was

an action for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the defendants
from issuing and selling general obligation bonds.

Under the

authority of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, the board of county
commissioners in each county in the State was empowered to

Ui

r

establish improvement districts for the purpose of operating
systems for supply, treatment and distribution of water; and
systems for the collection, treatment, and disposition of sewage.
Under this authority, the Magna Improvement District was formed.
Plaintiffs sought to prohibit the Magna Water Coopany from
issuing bonds pursuant to the authority of the act on the ground

that the County Commission acted beyond its constitutional and
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statutory authority.

Further, the plaintiffs argue that as

the act did not provide for review by the courts, it violated
sections 7 and 11 of Article I of the Utah State Constitution,
the Due Process Clauses.

This Court held that the acts of

municipalities or quasi-municipalities, when done within
the powers given by statute, are not subject to review by courts
unless manifest abuse of those powers is evident.
The governmental acts of quasi-municipalities
are like those of true municipalities, and when a
municipality acts within the powers given it by
statute, its acts are not subject to review by
courts unless there is a manifest abuse of those
powers or unless such right to review is granted by
statute.
(Id., at 132.)
This Court held that the Act did not violate due process because
the provisions of the Act gave "ample opportunity to interested
owners to protect their right and to prevent the formation of
such district where the owners of the majority of the real
property based on the assessed valuation thereof, object."

(!£ ..

at 133.)
Only recently this Court, in Child v. City of
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975), had before i t the questio
as to whether a court could examine the notives, purposes and
reasonableness of city council action.

In Child, the real

property owners within an area to be annexed by Spanish Fork
sought declaratory judgment that the city's requirements for
annexation were improper.
this Court, arguing,

Specifically, plaintiffs appealed to

(1) that the action of the City Council

was beyond its powers; and that it was arbitrary aud

unreaso~

able; and (2) that it violated plaintiff's constitutional
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rights to equal protection of the laws.

This Court affirmed

the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
and explained:
Ce~ta~n ~rinciples.are applicable in considering
the plaintiff s contentions. The first is that a
determination of city boundaries is a legislative
function, which is performed by its governing body.
The second logically follows therefrom: That in
carrying out that duty the city council is endowed
with broad discretion to make decisions and determine
policies which it thinks will best fulfill its
responsibilities. Consequently, as in all legislative
matters, courts are reluctant to interfere therewith;
and do so only when the decisions or actions are clearly
outside the authority of the governing body, or
are so wholly unreasonable or unjust that they must
be deemed capricious and arbitrary in adversely
affecting someone's rights. (Id., at 186.)

In Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643 (Utah
1972), plaintiffs, all resi<lents of Beaver City, sought to
enjoin the annexation of a tract uf about 21 acres of land
which was north of the city and helonged to the Interstate
Development Company.

Plaintiffs contended that the annexation

was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious and not done in
accordance with law and the prerogatives of the defendant
City Council.

The trial court granted defendant's motion

for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs claimed that the annexation was an unlawful
act of the City Council.

In response to this claim, the

district court held:
The court finds that even if the facts set forth
in the First Cause of Action were determined to be
true it would be outside the scope of authority of
this' court to make a ruling or determinat~on oi:i matters
that are within the discretion of the legislative
authorities and mayor of Beaver City. (Id., at 645.)
All other allegations of the complaint were similarly disposed
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of by the district court.

This Court affirmed, explaining:

The determination of the boundaries.of a city,
what rnay or may not be encompassed therein, includi~
annexation or severance is a legislative function
to be performed by the governing body of the city.
The courts are and should be reluctant to intrude
into the prerogative of the legislative branch of
government, and will interfere with such action only
if it plainly appears that it is so lacking in
propriety and reason that it must be deemed capricious
and arbitrary, or is in excess of the authority of
the legislative body. (Ibid.)
The law is clear in Utah.

The determination of the

boundaries of a municipality and the reasons for a city's
decision to annex adjacent territory are beyond the scope of
judicial review.
Plaintiff-Respondents in this action asked the
district court to deterrnine the propriety of the City
Connnission's action, to reweigh and to re-evaluate the
evidence before the City CoTtU:iission, and to determine whether
that action, in view of that Court's economic and social
theory, was reasonable or wise.

Such an inquiry is beyond

t~

scope of that court's jurisdiction.
2.

There was no evidence offered that the acts

of the City Commission in approving annexation were either
arbitrary or capricious.
At the hearing on Plaintiff-Respondents motion for
preliminary injunction and the Defendant-Appellees motion to
dismiss, Judge Croft explained to the plaintiffs just exactly
what had to be done if the court was to review the acts of
the City Commission.

-50-
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TH~

COURT: Secondly, you are attempting to
bring before the Court the procee<lin~s to date
before the Board of City Commissione~s asking this
Co~rt tu rule that what they have done to date is
void and.contrary to law. Now, isn't that what
your claim for relief is?
MR. SMAY:

That is right.

THE COURT: Certainly, we cannot do anything
more than review the action of the City Commission
up to the time Judge Durham issued a restraining
order.
MR. SMAY: What those actions were is a matter
of evidence which can be presented.
THE COURT: Which can be presented by bringing the
record of the proceeding before the Court on an
extraordinary writ. (Partial Transcript of
Proceedings, May 29, 1979, at 3-4.)
This was never done.

When the issue was submitted on summary

judgment, the Plaintiff-Respondents had not brought any record
of the City Commission's proceedings before the court.
Consequently, it would be impossible for the-district court to
determine that the City Commission had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.

Therefore, defendants' motion for summary

judgment on this point should have been granted.
Although as explained, supra, this Court should not
reweigh the information considered by the Commission in reaching
its decision, the information supplied to the Commission and the
evidence of the Commission's conduct demonstrates that it
was well informed at the time of the vote on annexation.
actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Its

(See, ~.

Mayor Wilson's Depo. pp. 18-22, 31, 33 & Ex. 9, at R.

.)

The facts show that the city conducted extensive
public hearings on the Annexation Petitions, which included

-51-
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discussions of proposed zoning ordinances, public service
requirements, and improved health and safety for canyon
residents.

The City Commission members who voted on the

Annexation Petitions were also provided with extensive and
detailed studies by various city departments, including
fire,

police, sewage, water, and health which concerned the

impact of annexation upon the city resources and the residents
of the annexed area.

Clearly, it cannot be said that a

decision reached by a legislative body after this r.iuch
research and consideration is arbitrary and capricious.
3.

In approving the petition for annexation,

all of the requirements of Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Ann.
(Pocket Supp. 1977) were followed and adhered to.
a.

On the morning of the City Commission's

action, the City Attorney reviewed the latest maps and assessnen:
rolls and petitions.

He determined that not only as to the

consolidated petition, but even as to each of the three

petit~m

separately, there were the requisite signatures petitioning f~
annexation.
Based upon that review, I am of the opinion
that a majority of property owners on
each of the annexation petitions presently
favors connection to the City on the following
particulars:
SS. 767.
100.00/.
100 .001.

Petition Ill
Petition #2
Petition #3

The total property owners petitioning represent,
by my figures, 61.2S~~ of all property owners in
the subject area.
(Letter frora Wally Miller,
Deputy City Attorney to Bd. of City Commissioners,
April 10, 1979.) (at R. 171-172.)
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on the date of the vote there were sufficient signatures under
the statute to require the City Commission action.

b.

The signers of all petitions were fully

informed of the area requested to be annexed by the particular
petitions.

Both Mr. Gardner and Hr. Johnson in their depositions

testified that they had shown the proper maps to all of the
residents living within the area outlining the areas to be
annexed.

(Gardner Depo., pp. 43-44, at R. 871-872; and Johnson

Depa., p. 33, at R. 927.)
c.

The Salt Lake Planning and Zoning

CoQmission found that the area to be annexed was contiguous to
Salt Lake City.

(Jorgensen Depo. pp. 8-11, at R. 824.)

Specifically, the Commission found that petition No. 1 was
contiguous to Salt Lake City and that petitions 2 and 3 are
contiguous to petition 1.

Consolidated, that contiguous area

is contiguous to Salt Lake City.
d.

Plaintiff-Respondents claim that the

action was not timely, suggesting that the City should have
not done such a thorough job in investigating the proposals.
Such a position is untenable.

No evidence was presented of any

unnecessary delay, but only of a desire of the Commission to
review all the issues thoroughly.
e.

The record in the district court shows

that no unincorporated island will be created as a result of the
annexation.

Section 10-2-402 prohibits only those annexations

"which would result in unincorporated islands being left within
the boundaries of the municipality."

In order to come within
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the ambit of this prohibition, Plaintiff-Respondents would have
had to show that the proposed annexation would:

(1) create

an unincorporated island; and (2) that said island would lie
within the boundaries of the munciipality.

No such showing was

made or even suggested to the district court.
F.

The Findings of Fact Sip,ned by the Judge after

the Notice of Appeal had been Filed, Transferring Jurisdiction to this Court, are not Supported by the Evidence.
A number of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law do not reflect the evidence before the court.

Pertaining

to Finding 3 and 4, there was no evidence presented which
supported the finding that Plaintiff-Respondents Doenges,
Crockard and Watson were residents and property owners of the
area sought to be annexed at all relevant times.

Furtherr.1ore,

there was no evidence in the record to support the finding
that Watson was an o\mer of real property in the area to be
annexed "for more than one year".

Specifically, \.latson at

his deposition testified that he had only moved into the area
in November of 1978, long after the assessnent rolls had been
filed.

(Watson Depo., p. 4, at R. 827.)
As is more full explained infra, Conclusion No. 3,

that Plaintiff-Respondents have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 10-2-401, is incorrect.

There

is no evidence to support any claim of standing that was before
the court at any time prior to the entry of the Memorandum
Decision on August 20, 1979.

Further, Conclusion of Law No.

5 is incorrect in that there was no evidence presented, no
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argument made or claim stated in any pleading of any injury
to the Plaintiff-Respondents, let alone an irreparable injury.
(~.

supra, pp. 18-20; also see Transcript of Proceedings of

August 9, 1979, PP· 48-49, at R. 1103-1104, where PlaintiffResondents' attorney alleged the only injury to Plaintiff-Respondents
is the transfer of their property from the county into the
city of Salt Lake.

This, as explained above, is not irreparable

injury.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff-Respondents are without standing to raise
the issue of constitutionality of Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Ann.
(Pocket Supp. 1977).

There is no constitutional right to vote on an

annexation proposal.

Annexations are for the legislature to decide.

Where the decision of annexation is made by a munciipal commission,
a party having the right to be heard before that commission is not
denied equal protection or due process.

Therefore, the Memorandum

Decision of the district court should be reversed.

Further, the

court below was without jurisdiction to enter Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

This Court should reverse the district court in

its entirety and find that the annexation resolution of the Salt
Lake City Board of Commissioners was proper and order annexation
of Emigration Canyon.
DATED this 9th day of November, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

::R~OKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL

D~J.~.

.

Attorney for Emigration Properties
Partnership, Bowers-Sorenson Construction Company and Fred A. Smolka
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801)
532-7840
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PART 4-EXTENBION OF CORPORATE LIMITS
Sect ion
10-2-401.
10-2-402.
10-2-403.
10-2-404.

Annexation
Limitations
Annexation
Annexation

ot contiguous territory.
on annexation.
deemed conclush·e.
across county lines.

10-2-401. Annexation of contiguous territory.-Whenever a majority
of the owners of real property and the owners of at least one third in
\'alue of the real property, as shown by the last assessment rolls, in territory lyi1:g contiguous to the ~orporate boundaries of any municipality,
shall desire to annex such territory to such municipality, they shall cause
an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made under the supen-ision
of the municipal engineer or a competent surveyor, and a copy of such
plat or map, certified by the engineer or surveyor as the case may be, shall
be filed in the office of the recorder of the municipality, together \'l"ith a
written petition signed by a majority of the real property owners and by
the owners of not less than one third in value of the real property, as shown
by the last assessment roles, of the territory described in the plat or map;
and the go\'erning body of the municipality, at a regular meeting shall
vote on the question of such annexation. The members of the governing
body may by resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, accept the petition
for annexation, subject to the terms and conditions as they deem reasonable, and the territory shall then and there be annexed and within the
boundaries of the municipality. If the territory is annexed, a copy of the
duly certified plat or map shall at once be filed in the office of the county
recorder, together with a certified copy of the resolution declaring the
annexation. The articles of incorporation of the municipality shall be
amended to sho\\" the new territory annexed to the municipality and a copy
of the artirles of amendment shall be filed with the secretary of state and
count~- clerk or clerks in the same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108. On
filing the maps, plats and articles of amendment, the annexation shall be
deemed complete and the territory annexed shall be deemed and held to
be part of the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants thereof shall
enjoy the pri\'ileges of the annexation and be subject to the ordinances,
resolutions and regulations of the annexing municipality.
Hlstory: c. 1953, 10·2·401, enacted by
L. 1977, ch. 48, § 2.

Conditions to annexation.
City was permitted to prodde for added
or expanded services by imposition of reasonable conditions precedent to the annexntion of new territory, and its demand for
transfer of water rights in return for
annexation w:is not inconsistent with, nor
in exerss of, the po"·ers of the city coun-

cil, nor was it unreasonable and arbitrary.
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P. 2d
184.
City had no duty to issue bonds, thus
oblij?ating entire city to pay for the acquisition of addit.ional. water needed ~s
result of annexation, in order to a,·01d
requiring transfer of annex area property
owners' water rights to the city as a
condition precedent to annexation. Child
v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P. 2d 184.
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